I am an Assistant Professor of Information Systems at Tilburg School of Economics and Management since July 2020. I received my Ph.D. in Information Systems at Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, with the committee chairs Srinivasan Raghunathan and Huseyin Cavusoglu.
I am broadly interested in economic modeling and data-driven decision making with a focus on applications in managing digital platform’s information strategy in competitive online marketplaces. In particular, my research covers topics ranging from online platforms, FinTech, open source software, and NFT.
My work is published at MIS Quarterly, and my papers are presented at prestigious conferences such as WISE, CIST, ICIS, SCECR, INFORMS and Platform Strategy Symposium.
PhD in Information Systems, 2020
University of Texas at Dallas
MSc in Industrial Engineering, 2015
Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey
BSc in Industrial Engineering, 2013
Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey
Product review platforms in online marketplaces differ with respect to the granularity of product quality information they provide. While some platforms provide a single overall rating for product quality (also referred to as single-dimensional rating scheme), others provide a separate rating for each individual quality attribute (also referred to as multi-dimensional rating scheme). A multi-dimensional rating scheme is superior to a single-dimensional rating scheme, ceteris paribus, in reducing consumers' uncertainty about product quality and value. However, we show that, when sellers respond to product ratings by adjusting their prices, compared to the single-dimensional rating scheme, the multi-dimensional rating scheme does not always benefit consumers, nor does it necessarily benefit the sellers or the society. The uncertainty associated with quality attribute rating and the extent of differentiation between competing products determine whether a finer-grained multi-dimensional rating scheme is superior to the coarser-grained single-dimensional rating scheme from the consumers', sellers' or a social planner’s perspective. The main driver of the results is that the more (less) granular and less (more) uncertain information exposes (hides) underlying differentiation, or lack of it, between competing products, which, in turn, alters the upstream price competition in the presence of heterogeneous consumer preferences. The results demonstrate that focusing on the information transfer aspect of rating schemes provides only a partial understanding of the true impacts of rating schemes.